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1. The issues presented here concern the validity 
of state taxation of (1) cigarette sales by members of certain 
Indian tribes to Indians and non-Indians on the reservation, 
and (2) the personal property of Indians who reside on the 
reservation, including their automobiles. Also drawn into 
question is the power of the United States District Court 
to enjoin the enforcement of the state tax laws in light of 
the general prohibition against such injunctions contained 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 
2. Facts and Opinions Below: The Flathead Indian 
Reservation, created by the Treaty of Hell Gate of 1855, 
12 Stat. 975, consists of approximately 1,245,000 acres, of 
which approximately 628,642 acres are owned in fee, some 
by Indians and some by non-Indians, 628,311 acres are held 
in trust for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes 
or individual Indians, and 1,017 acres are owned by the 
United States. The Reservation is located in Montana. 
Tribal members comprise 19% of the total Reservation popu-
lation. There are farms, ranches, and communities scattered 
throughout the inhabited portions of the Reservation. All 
services provided by the state and local governments are 
equally available to Indians and non-Indians. The state 
operates the only schools on the Reservation. A system of 
streets, county roads, and state highways has also been 
built and is maintained by the state and local governments. 
The federal government makes substantial expenditures for 
~




programs in education, social services~ housing improvement, 
employment assistance, forestry, road construction and main-
tenance, and Indian business development. 
Two separate actions were filed in the USDC (Montana) 
by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes and various 
members. Each case was heard by the same three-judge dis-
trict court. The first, from which appellees have taken a 
cross-appeal (No. 75-50), involved application of Montana's 
cigarette tax statutes to tribal members on the Reservation 
(hereinafter "Moe"). The second, not involved in the cross-
appeal, concerned the application of Montana's personal 
property tax to tribal members on the Reservation (hereinafter 
"Montana"). , {~) 
In Moe the cross-appellants challenged the constitu-
tional validity of the cigarette tax statutes of the State 
of Montana, R.C.M., 1947, §§ 84-5606-5606.31 and sought a 
permanent injunction against their future application to them. 
One of the plaintiffs below (Wheeler), who is now deceased, 
was a member of the Tribes and had established retail stores 
on two tracts of land within the Reservation held in trust 
by the United States, where he sold cigarettes. For the 
right to sell cigarettes he paid an administrative fee to 
the Tribes. The Tribes are also authorized by their Consti-
tution to tax_figarette sales within the Reservation but ve 
--. -
not done so to date. Wheeler did not possess a state cigarette -
vendor's license, and did not affix the state cigarette tax 
sales stamps or precollect the state cigarette sales tax, as 
4. 
r equired by Montana law. He was arrested for noncompliance 
with the state statutes and a portion of his inventory was 
confi sca t ed. The tax is 12 cents on a package, 4.5 cents 
of which is allocated by state law to the general revenue 
fund which is used f or the support of services to both 
Indians and non-Indians. 
The three-judge court declared the tax statutes in-
valid and permanently enjoined their enforcement to the 
extent that they required members of the Tribes residin~ on 
the Reservation to possess state vendor's licenses and to 
I 
the extent they applied to cigarette sales within the Reser-
vation by tribal members to Indians who resided within the 
~ 
Reservation. The court further .held that~the statutes were 
valid insofar as they required tribal members to precollect 
1 the state cigarette tax imposed on non-Indian purchasers. 
It is this latter portion of the judgment which is the subject 
of the cross-appeal. 
In reaching this holding the court rejected the con-
tention that it lacked the power to issue an injunction be-
cause of the Federal Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 
In its first opinion the court found § 1341 inapplicable 
under the federal instrumentality doctrine. Appx. 77-79. 
In its second opinion it recognized that the validity of 
1 Four s arate opinions were issued by the three-judge 
G._OU:J;:t_ in t ese cases, ~rst on c , 
The subsequent opinions build upon the first, and the 
final judgment was filed March 19, 1975. 
·'·· 
5. 
this doctrine as a basis for immunity from state taxation 
with respect to Indians and Indian property was questionable 
after Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 150-55 
(1973), and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 
164, 169-70 & n.5 (1974). Appx. 43 n.9. It thus reconsidered 
this question and examined the legislative history of § 1341 
and the cases decided thereunder. Appx. 41-47. The court 
concluded from this analysis that § 1341 does not bar federal 
court jurisdiction where "immunity from state taxation is 
asserted on the basis of federal law with respect to persons 
or entities in whieh the United States has a real and sig-
nificant interest." Id. 43. Accordingly it found it un-
necessary to decide whether plaintiff Wheeler's business 
venture was an instrumentality of the United States since 
there was no doubt that the United States has a real and 
significant interest in the Tribes and its members. 
The three-judge court then examined the existing 
jurisdictional relationships between the Tribes and Montana. 
\
Montana had assumed complete criminal and limited civil 
jurisdiction over the Indians residing in the Reservation 
P.L. 280, 67 Stat. 588, August 15, 1953, 
underkhe predecessor statute to 25 U.S.C. §§ _132Z, 1324 
considered by this Court in McClanahan. Even assuming the 
validity of this assumption of jurisdiction under P.L. 280 
the court reasoned that the 
tax laws were civil, not criminal, in nature and that Montana's 
._--.. -----
existing civil jurisdiction over the Reservation 
Indians (~ Appx. 49) did not justify the tax statutes here. 
6. 
It noted that under McClanahan and the prior decisions of 
this Court Indian citizens living on the Reservation are 
still regarded as a separate, semi-independent people, with 
the power of regulating their internal affairs, free from --
state interference. The court thus concluded that consis-
tent with these principles Montana did not have the power 
to impose a tax upon cigarette sales between Tribe members 
on the Reservation or require a Tribe member who sells 
cigarettes on the Reservation to obtain a dealer's license. 
The court reached an oeposite_ conclusion with respect 
to the pre-collection of cigarette excise taxes relating to 
sales to non-Indians. In reaching this conclusion the court 
first cited the state statutory provision which indicated ---that the cigarette taxes were conclusively presumed to be ~ 
a direct sales tax on the retail customer, pre-collected 0 
for the purpose of convenience only. Under this system ~~ 
the seller pays the tax to the wholesaler and adds the cost __/ 
to the purchase price of the cigarettes. The court then 
considered the many decisions of this Court concerning the 
power of the states over Indians, finding none controlling. 
It noted, for example, that this was not a case like Warren 
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 380 U.S. 685 (1965), 
where a licensed trader established a store for the benefit 
of Indians residing on the Reservation. These stores were 
located on U. S. Highway 93 and the court considered it a 
reasonable inference that the stores had not been established 
primarily for the benefit of Indians residing on the Reservation 
•' 
' I·' .. 
1 • 
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but instead were intended to sell cigarettes to prospective 
customers passing on the highway and to residents of neigh-
boring conununities who wished to avoid the sales tax. The 
court concluded that the tax was constitutional since col-
lection of it by the Indian seller would not impose a tax 
burden on the Indian:3 residing on the Reservation or infringe 
in any way tribal self-government. In support of this holding, 
it also cited the si:nilar conclusion reached by the Supreme 
Court of Washington after the remand by this Court in Tonasket 
v. Washington, 411 u.s. 451 (1973), for consideration of 
McClanahan. The Washington Supreme Court had concluded that 
McClanahan did not mandate the conclusion that a state could 
not impose a cigarette excise tax on sales to non-Indians on 
the Reservation. 525 P.2d 744. The three-judge court thus 
rejected the holding of the Supreme Court of Idaho in Mahoney 
v. State of Idaho Tax Comm'n., 524 P.2d 187 (1974), cert. 
denied, u.s. (1974), that the Idaho Tax Commission 
had "no jurisdiction to tax the on-reservation sale of cig-
arettes by an Indian seller whether the purchasers were 
Indians or non-Indians." 
Although agreeing that the court had jurisdiction, the 
Moe dissent said that the majority opinion accomplished a con-
stitutionally suspect discrimination in favor in Indians 
neither mandated by treaty or Act of Congress. The dissent 
disagreed with this Court's construction of the Buck Act in 
McClanahan to the effect that § 109 of the Act evidenced a -------....... ··--
Congressional intent to maintain the tax exempt status of 
8. 
Indians. Appx. 30. It then reasoned that if McClanahan were 
based on implica tion of tax exemption rather than on lack 
of jurisdiction it would have no difficulty distinguishing 
the situation here except with respect to sales on trust 
lands. Unlike the Navajos in McClanahan the Tribes here 
had no tradition of sovereignty until after the Indian Re-
organization Act of 1934 when tribal courts were created 
for the first ti(1'f-/~~~) 
In Montana the appellees sought (1) a judgment de-
"' claring unconstitutional as applied to them Montana statutes 
providing for the a ~;sessment and collection of state personal 
property taxes generally, and in particular,of personal ......._., 
property taxes on motor vehicles, (2) an injunction against 
the statutes' enforcement, and (3) a refund of personal 
property taxes paid to the date of the court's final judgment. 
In its opinion the three-judge court emphasized that the 
appellees did not challenge the state's vehicle registration 
fee which is used for the construction and maintenance of 
roads. They challenged only the motor vehicle property tax 
which is not a designated road tax and is used instead for 
general governmental purposes as are other personal property 
taxes. Relying on its decision in Moe the court held the 
challenged statutes unconstitutional insofar as they required 
the payment of a motor vehicle tax and other personal taxes 
by members of the Tribes residing on the reservations. 
McClanahan again was regarded as controlling. As in Moe the 





final determination of the unconstitutionality of the 
statute. 
The dissent objected to the judgment insofar as it 
declared unconstitutional R.C.M. § 53-114 which conditions 
the issuance of a license on the payment of property and 
license taxes. The dissent reasoned that although the holding 
in Moe mandated that the Reservation be considered a tax-
free sanctuary, thi:3 should not prevent the state from re-
quiring Indians to pay for the right to drive on off-reser-
vation highways and the right to the protection afforded by 
the off-reservation machinery of the Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles. 
3. Contentions: The appellants' (No. 74-1656) first 
contention is that the immunity from state taxation granted 
to the Indians of the Flathead Reservation is a racial dis-
crimination in favor of Indians and against non-Indian 
citizens repugnant to fundamental principles of equal pro-
tection and due process. Appellants cite a host of due 
process and equal protection cases, ~' Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 
(1954), in support of the proposition that the three-judge 
court decision forces Montana to engage in invidious 
discrimination based on race. 
Appellants' second contention is that the immunity 
from taxation afforded the Flathead Reservation Indians is 
contrary to section 349 of the General Allotment Act, 25 u.s.c. 
§ 349, and related legislation. Appellants cite the language 
\ ' 
10. 
of section 349 which provides that at 'the termination of the 
trust per iod provided for in the Act the land was to be con-
veyed to the Indian in fee and the allottee "shall have the 
benefit of and be. subject to the laws, both civil and criminal 
of the state or territory" in which he resided. Appellants 
recognize that the General Allotment Act became "inoperative" 
after the Indian Reorganization Act of ~934, 48 Stat. 984, 
but contend that it has not specifically been repudiated and 
is consistent with other federal legislation against 
discrimination. 
Appellants' third contention is that the three-judge 
court relied on the federal instrumentality doctrine to 
establish jurisdiction here in the face of the § 1341 pro-
hibition and that this is contrary to Mescalero and McClanahan. 
' 
Appellants also contend that since jurisdiction over the 
action of the individual tribal members was upheld under 
28 U.S.C. § 1343, this decision is in conflict with American 
Commuters Assoc., Inc. v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1969), 
and Bland v. McRann, 463 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
410 U.S. 966 (1973), holding that allegations of deprivations 
of civil rights involved in collection of taxes do not permit 
an exception to the § 1341 prohibition. 
In response appellees (No. 74-1656) in part cite the 
Treaty of Hell Gate which reserved for the "exclusive use and 
benefit" of the Salish and Kootenai Tribes the land encompassed 
by the Flathead Reservation and also the Montana Enabling Act 
of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, 677, which required the 
'·, 
\. .. · 
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state to disclaim all right and title 'to the Indian lands 
within its borders. They argue that there is no significant 
difference between the Flathead Reservation and the Navajo 
Reservation in McClanahan. Since there is no distinction 
between the taxes here and the income tax in McClanahan, the 
outcomes must be th<2 same. 
The cross-appellants (No. 75-50) contend that although 
the three-judge court correctly recognized that the Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959), test-- state laws are in-
valid when they reach the point of interfering with tribal 
self-government is applicable here, they misapplied it. 
The pre-collection of taxes with respect to sales to non-
Indians interferes with ·~ibal self-government since the 
Tribes are inhibited from exercising their tribal consti-
tutional authority to impose a tax on the merchandise be-
cause the tribal retailers would then be placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage. The Tribes are precluded from this 
source of revenue. Moreover, the three-judge court's decision 
is contrary to Warren Trading Post. Finally, cross-appellants 
contend that here, as in McClanahan, Montana has not assumed 
general jurisdiction over tribal members on the Reservation 
and there is no way the state can enforce the tax laws in 
question. Jurisdiction is the power to compel and the state 
lacks that power here. See 411 U.S. at 178-79. 
Cross-appellees argue that the retail outlets were 
operated by individual Indians, not the Tribes. Cross-appellants 
are not comparable to the licensed traders in Warren Trading 
12. 
Post. The tax is not upon the Indian seller, but the ulti-
mate purchaser. There is in fact no requirement that the 
Indian seller prepay the tax to the wholesaler when he pur-
chases cigarettes for resale. Sales to non-Indians without 
collection of the tax invites violation of criminal law by 
the non-Indian purchaser. R.S.M. § 84-5608.18 (1947). No 
decision of this Court suggests that such a result would 
find judicial acceptance. 
4. Discussion: Despite the demise of the federal 
instrumentality doctrine as a reason for insulating Indian 
affairs from state tax laws, ~Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, supra, at 150 and cases cited therein, an exception 
to the § 1341 prohibition for actions brought by Indians 
appears reasonable in light of the special federal interest 
in their affairs. The three-judge court indicated that the 
legislative history of § 1341 demonstrated that it was in-
tended to eliminate the disparity between the rights afforded 
citizens of a state, and nonresidents and foreign corpora-
tions who because of diversity jurisdiction were able to 
obtain injunctions in federal courts. This purpose would 
not be affected by the result here. The test of a "real and 
significant" federal interest in the particular group affected 
is perhaps too broad, however, since such an exception might 
arguably apply to any class of persons which the Congress has 
protected by statute. But see Bland v. McRann, supra at 24-25 
(allegations of deprivations of civil rights involved in tax 
collections does not provide an exception to§ 1341 prohibition). 
13. 
Ass wning that the three-judge c'ourt had jurisdiction 
then insofar as it held the Montana tax statutes unconsti-
tutionalJ the result appears correct under Warren Trading 
Post, McClanahan, Williams, and the other decisions of this 
Court in this area. Bu~ despite the fact (1) the cigarette 
tax was upon the final purchaser, not the Indian seller, 
(2) the stores were located so as to attract non-Indian 
business, and (3) the cigarettes are in no way connected 
with reservation production or manufacture, the holding that 
the cigarette excise tax with respect to sales on the Flat- 7 
h d R . I d' . . . 1 . ~ 
1 
ea eservatlon to non- n lans lS constltutlona lS ques-
tionable. This is particularly so because the cross-appellants 
assert that the state has not validly asswned general juris-
diction over the tribal members on the Reservation and con-
~~~ 
sequently, as in McClanahan, it does notAhave the juris-
diction necessary to enforce the tax. The three-judge court 
did not deal with this question. In its anlaysis of the 
tax or; cigarette 
validity of the sales to Indians on the Flathead Reservation 
/\ 
it asswned, arguendo, that the state had validly asswned com-
plete criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over the Indians 
residing there. It then concluded that, even though subject 
to being enforced by criminal statutes, the taxing statutes 
were civil in nature, and that the prior limited asswnption 
of civil jurisdiction did not support the taxing statutes here. 
The appellees in both the main appeal and the cross-appeal 
have filed motions to affinn. 
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